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The Emerging Consensus for Cutting the 
Corporate Income Tax Rate 
By Jordan M. Barry* 
INTRODUCTION 
Contemporary tax policy circles are characterized by healthy 
debates on a range of policy measures. However, a consensus has 
emerged among tax policy experts on one point: the United 
States should lower its statutory corporate income tax (“CIT”) 
rate.1 Doing so would produce a number of benefits, both 
internationally and domestically. This short Article summarizes 
some of the chief benefits that are driving the consensus for a 
reduced CIT rate. It also describes the surprising degree of 
political agreement that has quietly emerged on this point.  
I. INTERNATIONAL TAX BENEFITS 
Much of the consensus surrounding the value of cutting the 
U.S. CIT rate derives from concerns about U.S. competitiveness. 
 
 * Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. 
 1 See, e.g., Karen C. Burke, Is the Corporate Tax System “Broken”?, 28 VA. TAX REV. 
341, 363–66 (2008); Karen C. Burke, Passthrough Entities: The Missing Element in 
Business Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1329, 1329 (2013); Peter R. Merrill, Competitive 
Tax Rates for U.S. Companies: How Low to Go?, 122 TAX NOTES 1009 (2009), available at 
taxprof.typepad.com/files/tn1009.pdf; David M. Schizer, Fiscal Policy in an Era of 
Austerity, 35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 453 (2012); Joseph J. Thorndike, The Durability of a 
Dysfunctional Tax: Public Opinion and the Failure of Corporate Tax Reform, 21 KAN. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 347, 350 (2012); John Diamond & George Zodrow, The Case for Corporate 
Income Tax Reform, AM. ACTION F. (May 29, 2013), http://www.americanactionforum.org/ 
research/the-case-for-corporate-income-tax-reform; Dan Maffei & Ryan McConaghy, The 
Case for Corporate Tax Reform, THIRD WAY 1 (Aug. 2011), http://content.third 
way.org/publications/434/Third_Way_Policy_Memo_-_The_Case_for_Corporate_Tax_Refor 
m.pdf; Tax: Fundamentals in Advance of Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin. , 
110th Cong. 20–21 (2008) (statement of Michael J. Graetz, Professor of Law, Yale Law 
School), available at http://www.finance.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=dd061d06-e1ba-
5190-a38 f-6fbf4c8dab2e; PETE DOMENICI & ALICE RIVLIN, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., 
RESTORING AMERICA’S FUTURE: REVIVING THE ECONOMY, CUTTING SPENDING AND DEBT, 
AND CREATING A SIMPLE, PRO-GROWTH TAX SYSTEM 17 (2010), available at http://www.bi 
partisanpolicy.org/projects/domenici-rivlin-debt-reduction-task-force; see also Dylan 
Matthews, Everyone Wants to Lower Corporate Tax Rates. Here’s How You Do It., WASH. 
POST (Sept. 26, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/09/26/ 
everyone-wants-to-lower-corporate-tax-rates-heres-how-you-do-it/ (“Everyone wants to cut 
the corporate income tax rate. That’s one of the few areas of real common ground in 
American tax policy . . . . All three major bipartisan tax reform plans—Bowles-Simpson, 
Domenici-Rivlin and Wyden-Coats—include a corporate rate cut.”).  
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Reducing the statutory CIT rate would make the United States a 
more attractive business environment by lowering the tax cost of 
doing business in the United States. At the margin, this would 
help encourage more businesses to open and operate in the 
United States.  
The argument laid out above can be made for any country 
that imposes a CIT. However, there is a sense among many that 
the United States is in particular need of a CIT rate cut. The 
basic argument is as follows: Over the last twenty-five years, 
business has become increasingly mobile. This has fueled an 
increase in tax competition among jurisdictions, which have cut 
their statutory CIT rates to attract businesses.2 The United 
States has not participated in this rate cutting and has kept its 
statutory CIT rate relatively steady at a little below 40%.3 In 
1990, a 40% CIT rate was slightly below the OECD average.4 
However, by 2010, the average CIT rate of non-U.S. OECD 
countries had fallen to approximately 25%.5 Thus, the United 
States, by maintaining the same CIT rate, has found itself 
changed from a low-CIT-rate country to the nation with the 
highest statutory CIT rate in the OECD.6   
Tax policy experts know that the story described above is 
accurate, but incomplete.7 Focusing on the effective tax rates that 
U.S. companies actually pay paints a more complicated picture. 
U.S. CIT revenues, as a percentage of GDP, have been below the 
OECD average almost every year since 1981.8 For example, in 
 
 2 See, e.g., Bert Brys, Stephen Matthews & Jeffrey Owens, Tax Reform Trends in 
OECD Countries (OECD Ctr. for Tax Policy and Admin., Working Paper No. 1, 2011), 
available at http://www.dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kg3h0xxmz8t-en; Merrill, supra note 1, at 
1009–10. 
 3 See Merrill, supra note 1, at 1010. This number includes both the federal 
corporate tax rate and state- and local-level corporate income taxes. Id. 
 4 At that time, the average CIT rate of non-U.S. OECD countries was a little over 
41%. See, e.g., OECD Corporate Income Tax Rates, 1981-2013, TAX FOUND. (Dec. 18, 
2013), http://www.taxfoundation.org/article/oecd-corporate-income-tax-rates-1981-2013 
(reporting statistics corresponding to a 41.2% average CIT rate across non-U.S. OECD 
member countries in 1990). The GDP-weighted average tax rate of non-U.S. OECD 
member countries was even higher. Id. 
 5 See id. (reporting statistics corresponding to a 25.2% average CIT rate across 
non-U.S. OECD member countries in 2010). 
 6 See, e.g., Kyle Pomerleau & Andrew Lundeen, The U.S. Has the Highest Corporate 
Income Tax Rate in the OECD, TAX FOUND. (Jan. 27, 2014), http://www.tax 
foundation.org/blog/us-has-highest-corporate-income-tax-rate-oecd (identifying the U.S. 
CIT rate, including both federal and state-level CITs, as 39.1%, and the next-highest CIT 
rate as Japan’s 37.0%).  
 7 See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 759 (2011) 
(“[T]he gap between U.S. and world corporate [statutory] tax rate[s] . . . is sometimes 
overstated.”).  
 8 Revenue Statistics - Comparative Tables, OECD STATEXTRACTS, http://stats.oe 
cd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=REV (last visited July 11, 2014). In 1994 and 1995, the 
U.S. percentage was 0.1% above the OECD average, and in 1996 the U.S. percentage and 
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2009, U.S. CIT revenues constituted less than 2% of U.S. GDP, 
one of the smallest proportions in the OECD.9 From this 
perspective, the United States could be seen as a low-CIT nation.  
Nonetheless, the general sense that the United States is a 
high-tax environment for corporations seems to have set in, and 
the impression seems to be a powerful one. This may be because 
the statutory CIT rate is simply much more visible than most 
other information about the corporate tax system. To the extent 
that this perception drives investment behavior, this is a problem 
for U.S. competitiveness. If so, this suggests that there may be 
real benefits to reducing the corporate income tax rate—even if 
doing so did not have a large impact on effective tax rates.  
II. DOMESTIC TAX BENEFITS 
In addition to increasing U.S. competitiveness, lowering the 
statutory CIT rate would have a number of domestic benefits. 
Our corporate tax laws affect all manner of business decisions, 
including which legal entity to use, which types of business to 
pursue, and how to fund the business. Many of these effects are 
negative, and a lower CIT rate would help ameliorate them.  
U.S. taxpayers can choose to operate their businesses 
through a number of legal entities, including many pass-through 
business entities that are not subject to entity-level tax. The 
menu of pass-through options includes S corporations, 
disregarded entities, and partnerships, as well as more 
specialized structures such as regulated investment companies 
(“RICs”) and real estate investment trusts (“REITs”).  
The abundance of pass-through options is one of the reasons 
why the United States has the highest statutory CIT rate in the 
OECD, yet its CIT collects a smaller percentage of GDP than 
other countries do. Consider a 2007 OECD study that looked at 
the number of incorporated and unincorporated businesses with 
varying characteristics in OECD member nations. It found that, 
among U.S. businesses with annual income of $500,000 or more, 
there were more than twice as many unincorporated businesses 
as incorporated businesses.10 In every other country, this ratio 
 
the OECD average were equal. On average, from 1982 through 2012 (the most recent year 
for which data was available), the United States’ figure was 79% of the OECD average; 
looking at medians gives a similar picture. Id. 
 9 See id. (indicating that, in 2009, U.S. taxes on corporate profits raised revenue 
equal to 1.7% of U.S. GDP, tied with Austria for the third lowest among OECD countries; 
the OECD average was 2.8%).  
 10 See ALFONS J. WEICHENRIEDER, OECD, SURVEY ON THE TAXATION OF SMALL AND 
MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES: DRAFT REPORT ON RESPONSES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE 7–8 
tbl.1 (2007), available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/39597756.pdf (reporting a 
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was reversed—there were at least two incorporated businesses 
for every unincorporated business at this income level.11   
The U.S. pass-through sector has seen pronounced growth 
since the 1980s. This growth seems tied to the tax reform bills of 
the era, which reduced statutory tax rates for individuals12 and 
raised the tax burden on corporate income, making it more tax 
efficient to operate a business via a pass-through entity than 
through the corporate form.13 The subsequent changes in 
business entity choices, presumably due at least in part to these 
changes in tax incentives, have been dramatic.  
For example, in 1980, C corporations filed slightly more 
federal tax returns than pass-through entities did, but the 
figures were comparable.14 By 2008, pass-through entities filed 
more than four times as many returns as C corporations did.15 In 
1985, C corporations filed more than three times as many returns 
as S corporations;16 by 2008, that ratio had almost reversed 
itself.17 Looking at income earned, instead of at returns filed, 
tells a similar story: in 1980, C corporations earned over four 
times as much income as pass-through entities;18 by 2008, 
pass-through entities earned significantly more income than C 
corporations.19   
 
total of 81,000 such unincorporated entities and 29,000 incorporated entities).  
 11 See id. The country with the next closest ratio is the United Kingdom, which had 
2.1 incorporated businesses for every unincorporated business in this income range. Id. 
 12 The Tax Reform Act of 1986 reduced the marginal tax rate on the highest earners 
from 50% to 28%. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 104(b)(8), 100 Stat. 
2085, 2105.  
 13 In particular, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 repealed the General Utilities doctrine, 
which enabled corporations to distribute appreciated property to shareholders without 
triggering entity-level tax. This essentially enabled many corporations to avoid the 
corporate income tax. When this doctrine was repealed, more corporate income was 
subject to two levels of tax, once at the corporate level and once at the shareholder level, 
significantly raising the effective tax rate on corporate income. Id. 
 14 That year, there were 2,163,458 C corporation returns filed, and a combined total 
of 1,926,734 returns filed by S Corporations, RICs, REITs, and partnerships. These 
figures do not include the 8,931,712 returns filed by non-farm sole proprietorships. See 
SOI Tax Stats – Integrated Business Data, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. tbl.1, http://www.irs. 
gov/uac/SOI-Tax-Stats-Integrated-Business-Data (last visited Sept. 24, 2014). 
 15 Id. (reporting the filing of 1,782,478 returns by C corporations and a combined 
total of 7,210,749 returns by S Corporations, RICs, REITs, and partnerships, not 
including the 22,614,483 returns filed by non-farm sole proprietorships).  
 16 Id. (reporting that C corporations and S corporations filed 2,549,091 and 724,749 
returns, respectively; a ratio of 3.52:1).  
 17 Id. (reporting that C corporations and S corporations filed 1,782,478 and 4,049,944 
returns, respectively; a ratio of 1:2.27).  
 18 Id. (reporting C corporation net income of $288,701,762,000 and combined S 
corporation, RIC, REIT, and partnership net income of $67,857,464,000; a ratio of 4.25:1). 
 19 Id. (reporting C corporation net income of $1,078,770,113,000 and combined S 
corporation, RIC, REIT, and partnership net income of $1,728,971,856,000; a ratio of 
1:1.603). 
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If our tax laws are pushing U.S. businesses out of the 
corporate form and into pass-through entities, that is not a good 
thing. Essentially, this would mean that, when individuals are 
choosing how to structure their businesses, tax law is putting a 
thumb on the scale in favor of passthroughs and against C 
corporations. That means that some businesses that would be 
better managed as C corporations will not be conducted that way. 
By pushing these businesses out of the CIT base, we both reduce 
government revenue and reduce economic activity overall due to 
the less efficient management structure.  
Similarly, there are several other features of pass-through 
entities that may also have negative economic impacts. For 
example, S corporations have significant limits on their capital 
structures, both in terms of the kinds of ownership interests that 
they can issue20 and the shareholders that they are allowed to 
have.21 Partnerships generally have more complicated returns 
than corporations, increasing compliance costs. Incurring these 
costs to reduce one’s tax bill may make perfect sense from an 
individual businessperson’s perspective, but little sense from an 
overall policy perspective. Lowering the corporate tax rate would 
help to reduce the tax system’s influence on entity choice 
decisions, reducing all of these costs.  
In addition, U.S. tax laws provide many deductions and 
credits that reduce the size of the CIT base.22 From a policy 
perspective, this combination of a smaller base with a higher tax 
rate leaves much to be desired. These deductions and credits also 
tend to be fairly complicated, and are often industry-specific.23 
This makes it more difficult to understand the tax system, 
rendering the tax law more opaque. Such opacity makes it harder 
for constituents to understand and evaluate what their 
representatives have done, reducing political accountability and 
the force of popular opinion on policymaking.  
An increase in the use of business tax expenditures also 
means that politically favored companies and industries are able 
to get tax breaks that others are not.24 This disparate treatment 
 
 20 See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (2012). 
 21 See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(A)–(C). 
 22 This is a second reason why U.S. CIT revenues are much lower than the statutory 
rate.  
 23 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 179C (allowing the expensing of certain capital purchases for 
refineries); I.R.C. § 179E (allowing the expensing of certain capital purchases for mine 
safety equipment); I.R.C. § 181 (allowing the expensing of certain costs for qualified film 
and television productions). 
 24 See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010) 
(discussing same); see also Jordan Barry, Response, On Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. 
REV. SEE ALSO 69 (2011).  
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is unfair, as it treats similarly situated taxpayers differently.25 
Moreover, the tax system is once again putting its thumb on the 
scale in favor of certain businesses relative to others, producing a 
different outcome than market competition would otherwise 
produce. More colloquially, the tax system is picking winners and 
losers. This is likely to produce inefficient outcomes.  
The combined effects of these deductions and credits have 
been quite significant. For example, in 2009, publicly traded 
biotechnology firms had an average effective CIT rate of 4.5%.26 
In contrast, publicly traded trucking firms had an average 
effective CIT rate of 30.9%.27   
Reducing the statutory CIT rate reduces the value of tax 
breaks. This both decreases the unfairness in treatment between 
favored and disfavored industries and the extent to which the tax 
system encourages certain types of economic activity over others.  
Higher CIT rates also encourage capital structures with a 
higher percentage of debt relative to equity.28 Because interest 
payments are deductible, money paid out to creditors is only 
subject to tax once, at the creditor level. In contrast, dividends 
paid to stockholders are subject to tax twice: First, the 
corporation pays tax when it earns the income. Second, the 
shareholder pays tax when she receives the dividend. The 
increased use of debt financing makes companies more brittle; in 
a downturn, a company funded with equity can reduce its 
dividend or suspend paying a dividend altogether. On the other 
hand, a company that cannot make interest payments on its debt 
faces the prospect of bankruptcy. This can potentially exacerbate 
business cycles, making recessions and depressions more severe 
and longer lasting.29 
 
 25 Another way to describe this phenomenon is that it constitutes a violation of the 
principle of horizontal equity.  
 26 See Binyamin Appelbaum, Corporate Tax Code Proves Hard to Change, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 27, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/28/us/politics/28tax.html; see also 
Mike Bostock et al., Across U.S. Companies, Tax Rates Vary Greatly, N.Y. TIMES (May 
25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/05/25/sunday-review/corporate-taxes. 
html (reporting effective CIT rates among S&P 500 companies by sector; the range was 
significant; utilities paid an average effective CIT rate of 12%, while retailers paid 34%).  
 27 Bostock et al., supra note 26. 
 28 See, e.g., Ruud A. de Mooij, The Tax Elasticity of Corporate Debt: A Synthesis of 
Size and Variations (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 11/95, 2011), available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2011/wp1195.pdf (collecting and reviewing 
studies of the effect of the CIT on the use of debt financing). Tax rates can also affect 
corporate capital structures in more subtle ways. See, e.g., Jordan M. Barry & John 
William Hatfield, Pills and Partisans: Understanding Takeover Defenses, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 633, 658–59 (2012) (discussing how tax considerations can influence the structure of 
corporate mergers and acquisitions). 
 29 See, e.g., Hilary J. Allen, Let’s Talk About Tax: Fixing Bank Incentives to Sabotage 
Stability, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 821, 839–44 (2013) (discussing the effect of the 
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III. POLITICAL AGREEMENT 
The consensus for cutting the CIT rate also extends to the 
political arena. For example, during the 2012 presidential 
election, both Barack Obama and Mitt Romney advocated for a 
CIT rate cut.30 More surprisingly, both advocated for nearly the 
same cut: Mitt Romney proposed a 25% federal CIT rate.31 
Barack Obama proposed a 28% federal CIT rate, along with a 
deduction for manufacturers that would ultimately give them a 
25% federal CIT rate.32 Considering the degree of polarization in 
contemporary politics and the 35% federal CIT rate currently in 
effect,33 the size of the gap between these two policy positions 
seems quite small.  
In addition, cutting the CIT rate could help reduce 
disagreement surrounding one of the tax policy questions on 
which Democrats and Republicans are most strongly 
divided: How should the United States tax income earned by U.S. 
corporations and their subsidiaries in non-U.S. jurisdictions?   
Currently, U.S. corporations with foreign subsidiaries 
generally do not owe U.S. tax on income that those subsidiaries 
earn overseas until they repatriate those earnings.34 This system 
has several negative effects: Most other companies’ corporations 
are not subject to domestic tax on income that they earn in other 
countries. Because U.S. corporations investing abroad can face 
an additional level of tax, this can place them at a competitive 
disadvantage. Further, because income earned in foreign 
jurisdictions is not subject to U.S. tax until repatriated, it 
encourages U.S. businesses to move profits to lower-tax 
countries. Finally, because profits earned abroad are not subject 
 
CIT deduction for debt on banks, and suggesting that the effect is much larger than the 
“too big to fail” subsidy enjoyed by the largest institutions).  
 30 See THE WHITE HOUSE & THE DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S 
FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM 1 (2012) [hereinafter OBAMA PLAN], available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Framewor 
k-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf; BELIEVE IN AMERICA: MITT ROMNEY’S PLAN 
FOR JOBS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 6 (2011) [hereinafter ROMNEY PLAN], available at 
http://www.thepoliticalguide.com/Items/MittRomney/BelieveInAmerica-PlanForJobsAndE 
conomicGrowth-Full.pdf. 
 31 See ROMNEY PLAN, supra note 30, at 6, 43–45. This proposal did not end with the 
Romney campaign, and remains favored in Republican circles. In February 2014, House 
Ways and Means Committee Chairman Dave Camp put forward a tax reform proposal 
that also includes a 25% CIT rate. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 113TH CONG., 
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 2014: FIXING OUR BROKEN TAX CODE SO THAT IT WORKS FOR 
AMERICAN FAMILIES AND JOB CREATORS 19 (2014), available at http://www.waysand 
means.house.gov/uploadedfiles/tax_reform_executive_summary.pdf. 
 32 See OBAMA PLAN, supra note 30, at 1, 9, 12.  
 33 This is a slight oversimplification. See I.R.C. § 11(b) (2012).  
 34 This is an oversimplification. Special rules apply to certain types of income, 
sometimes referred to as Subpart F income. See I.R.C. §§ 951–965. 
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to U.S. tax until they are returned to the United States, 
companies have an incentive to keep those profits overseas 
instead of bringing them back to the United States.  
Democrats and Republicans have weighed these varying 
concerns differently. Democrats have tended to focus on reducing 
the incentive for U.S. businesses to move profits overseas. For 
example, President Barack Obama has proposed a minimum tax 
on foreign income at the time it is earned.35 This would help 
reduce the relative benefits of earning income offshore instead of 
in the United States, but would make U.S. businesses competing 
abroad less competitive.36 Republicans, in contrast, have focused 
more on the issue of U.S. competitiveness. Mitt Romney 
advocated switching to a territorial tax system, which would 
mean no U.S. tax on income earned abroad.37 This would improve 
the competitive position of U.S. businesses operating abroad; 
however, it would also increase U.S. businesses’ incentives to 
move profits overseas.38  
Regardless, cutting the CIT rate helps with all three of these 
concerns: It reduces the competitive disadvantage to U.S. 
corporations from being subject to the U.S. CIT. It narrows the 
tax differential between earning profits in the United States and 
earning them in low-tax jurisdictions, reducing the incentive to 
shift profits out of the country. It reduces the tax cost of 
repatriating foreign earnings, which will encourage more 
repatriation at the margin. Thus, cutting the U.S. CIT rate is 
both a point of agreement across both parties, as well as a policy 
measure that will help reduce the magnitude of existing political 
disagreements.  
CONCLUSION 
This Article recaps some of the chief factors that have fueled 
the emerging consensus in favor of a cut in the statutory CIT 
rate. That said, it bears emphasis that tax policy experts 
generally envision such a cut as part of a larger tax reform 
package—and there is considerable disagreement on what the 
rest of that package should look like.  
 
 35 See OBAMA PLAN, supra note 30, at 14. 
 36 Currently, the advantage of foreign profits is that U.S. tax on such profits is 
deferred until they are repatriated. See id. at 13. Under such a change, more tax would be 
due at the time the income is earned, reducing the amount of tax deferred. Id. at 14. Such 
a change would also help reduce taxpayers’ incentives to leave foreign profits in foreign 
subsidiaries. Id. 
 37 See ROMNEY PLAN, supra note 30, at 45–46. 
 38 Currently, the advantage of foreign profits is that U.S. tax on such profits is 
deferred until they are repatriated. See id. at 46. Under this change, such profits would be 
exempt from U.S. taxation—a significantly larger advantage.  
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Many call for a CIT rate cut to be paired with 
base-broadening provisions that eliminate or pare down existing 
deductions and credits.39 Commentators disagree on which 
deductions and credits to target, and to what extent. Some, 
concerned about budget deficits, believe that a CIT rate cut can 
only be enacted if accompanied by spending cuts, new revenue 
raised from individuals, or a combination of both. Other 
commentators worry that a CIT rate cut could reduce the 
progressivity of our tax system, exacerbating economic 
inequality,40 and must be enacted along with other tax provisions 
designed to counteract this effect. On a more nuts-and-bolts level, 
a reduced corporate tax rate, coupled with capital gains 
treatment for dividends, could render income earned through the 
corporate form subject to less tax than income earned by 
individuals.41 This could open up an opportunity for tax 
avoidance and reduce the effectiveness of the individual income 
tax.  
All of these are significant concerns for policymakers, and 
assembling a package that addresses them all will not be easy. 
Nor does it seem probable that such a package will emerge in the 
near future. But, given the broad support among commentators 
and policymakers for cutting the statutory CIT rate, such a cut 
does seem very likely to happen—eventually. 
 
 39 See, e.g., OBAMA PLAN, supra note 30, at 9–10. 
 40 The short version of this argument is as follows: The burden of the CIT is 
primarily borne by a combination of shareholders and executives. Both tend to be 
wealthier than the average American. Accordingly, reducing the corporate tax will reduce 
the tax burden on those with more income, rendering the tax system less progressive.  
 41 For example, a 20% CIT rate, coupled with a 20% capital gains rate on dividends 
would mean that shareholders keep 80% of 80% (=64%) of distributed corporate profits—
in other words, the net tax rate on such income is 36%. This is less than the current top 
individual rate. Moreover, if profits grow as money is reinvested, deferring the payment of 
dividends and reinvesting at the corporate level subject to a lower tax rate can 
significantly magnify this advantage. 
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